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On Thinking Like a Roman:
The Philosophical Tradition
of Renaissance Humanism

Michael Mooney

I
The passing from life of Leonardo Bruni, so we learn from
an inscription on his tomb in Santa Croce, "caused history to
grieve and eloquence to be silent, while none of the Latin or Greek
muses could hold back their tears." Remarkable as this train of
mourners was, one would think that also philosophy could have
troubled herself . One in a line of learned Florentine chancellors,
Bruni had led nothing if not a well-examined life, pondering as
well as embodying the virtues of citizenship he prized, and among
the works he left to posterity was the corpus of Aristotle itself,
newly translated and arranged. Yet philosophy had no part in his
wake, or her presence among the mourners was so discreet as to
cause no one to take note of it.
If not even the death of Bruni, the lodestar of Quattrocento
Florence, could work the sympathy of philosophy, should we
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wonder that Renaissance humanism as a whole should pass into
history so little remembered by the noblest of all disciplines? Its
artists and architects made indelible impressions, leaving behind
new forms and techniques, and arguably new ways in which to
consider their works; its social and political thinkers, faced with
the ever-shifting arrangements of Church and State, found new
or refined bases in human reason and will for the formation of
polities; its historians and legal scholars broke the hold of Roman
formalism and led their disciplines to the forms in which we now
recognize them; above all its poets, orators, and philologists,
newly conscious of the origin and growth of words and texts, laid
the basis for the range of studies we now call proudly the
"humanities." But its philosophers-were
they too the pride of
Renaissance humanism, and their ideas a part of its legacy?
In any conventional sense, the answer is likely to be no. The
humanists produced no single towering philosophical figure, no
Aristotle or Thomas, Leibniz or Kant, Wittgenstein or Russell.
They devised no great system of thought, like Spinoza's or
Hegel's, that is remembered as bearing the stamp of the era. They
coined no single technical term for permanent deposit in the treasury of philosophical vocabulary. Their contributions to logic, it is
now recognized, helped speed the development of scientific
methodology, and their novel conceptions of such fundamental
categories as place, force, and continuity prepared the way for
the new physics of the seventeenth century; yet in the long view
of history even these achievements, like those in "moral"
philosophy, their professional metier, seem merely tentative or
largely derivative.
If we are to find any lingering philosophical significance in
Renaissance humanism, it seems, we must abandon the idea that
philosophy is to be had only in a succession of remarkable figures
and their well-etched systems, and must relax if not discard the
sharp disciplinary definitions-the useful bias of the previous century and our own-by which philosophy is set off from the work
of other scholars who also choose to think deeply, if less systematically, on "things human and divine." That is in any event the
course I wish to follow here, not by examining the work of any
Renaissance thinker in particular, but by attempting to trace out the
darkest lines of a tradition of ideas, very old indeed, in which Renaissance humanism as a whole has its standing and its importance.
This lineage of humanism, or so I propose, is one of two great
traditions of Western thought and sensibility, having a characteristic set of ideas and assumptions which, in the final analysis, are
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irreducible to those of any larger or grander scheme. The tradition
took root in the formative years of Western culture itself and has
evolved over the centuries through various permutations, down
to our own day. I choose to call it the "Roman" tradition, in
contrast to the "Greek" -terms nonetheless which have less to
do with the biases of any nation or region than with forms or
types of the Western spirit itself.
II

In and beyond the marks of family, clan, and ethnos by which
we also have our identity, and in and through the political and
religious institutions which inform our values and actions, we
recognize in the deepest reaches of our spirit a cluster of ideals
or "excellences" toward which we all as Westerners almost instinctively strive. To Homer's Odysseus, the virtues of our humanity
are three-comeliness
of form, strength of mind, and beauty of
words-----each of which resembles, in its highest form, a godlike
perfection . Though sometimes sought beyond all reason, physical
beauty seems seldom to be ranked with the virtues of mind and
tongue: it is perhaps too evanescent, or seems too much a given,
too little achieved, to hold out its claim against the others. Between
the perfections of knowledge and eloquence, however, we find
in our history, as indeed in ourselves, a regular and often unfriendly battle for ascendancy. For who is it finally who commands
the culture-philosophers
and scientists, the intellectual elite who
know and now arrange the structures of our world? Or is it the
poets and orators, those who inspirit, lead, and guide our society?
Walk the streets of New York City, that pinnacle of Western
aspirations, and one finds this issue debated in stone . At the heart
of Rockefeller Center rests the golden figure of Prometheus, portrayed in the very act of stealing fire from the gods, a worthy
tribute to the kingdoms of business and technology which surround it; while in Federal Circle to the south of the Center stands
a row of majestic court buildings, each inscribed with a more
noble sentiment than the next, promising that justice is universal
and blind, that truth will out, and that each shall have his own.
In which of these monuments are we to glory? Or more precisely:
in which of the two do we find the center of our culture, the
signature of our best efforts? In which do we have our highest
and proudest achievement?
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Consciously or not, the builders of New York have set out
for us in graphic form the same tension of soul present in the
elegant creation myth of Plato's Protagoras.Prometheus, we recall,
was only one of the heroes in that great drama. Fitted out by
Epimetheus with wings and hoofs, tough skins and special coloration, and given assorted means for nourishing and procreating
themselves, the brutes of the earth were provided for well and
made the human mortals-"naked,
unshod, unbedded, and unarmed"-seem
frightfully vulnerable by comparison. Thus Prometheus, in a bold act of genius, stole from Hephaestus and
Athena the skills of the arts and crafts, together with fire, and
gave these to man so that he might protect and preserve his
species. Inspecting the result some time later, Zeus could rejoice
at what man had achieved with his technical arts-houses
and
clothes, shoes and bedding, foods of every kind-yet he also
discovered a pervasive tragedy: whenever they gathered themselves into cities for protection against the beasts, men devoured
instead themselves, for they lacked the political wisdom that Zeus
alone possessed. Thus Zeus sent Hermes to give mankind "respect
for others" and "a sense of justice." And how shall I distribute
these gifts? Hermes asked. As the arts were distributed-that
is,
on the principle that one trained expert suffices for many laymen?
Or shall I distribute them to all alike? "Let all have their share,"
Zeus replied.
Asked to ponder the Protagoras,the Greeks and the Romans
among us will differ sharply in their reactions. The Greek will
linger in triumph on the words that tell of Prometheus' theft of
fire from the gods, finding therein the promise of knowledge and
power to the select of the race; the Roman, in contrast, will read
further, nodding pensively at the news that Zeus, in a desperate
effort to equip our kind for life in society, gave us in addition to
fire a sense of justice, distributing it in equal measure to all. The
Greek is not indifferent to the predicament of man in society, but
he will try, as if on principle, to treat it as a technical or scientific
problem. Seeing truth as the privilege of experts, he will look for
a Philosopher-King to regulate our affairs. Or he will contemplate
a system of natural law and deduce from it the principles of right
living. Or he will turn the sense of justice into a science of justice,
formulating its tenets and procedures and having them administered in secure, arcane ways. Or he will think out an ontology of
society, a grand utopian vision, and from it devise a Five-Year
Plan for the political economy. For the Roman, on the other hand,
the path to a just society is altogether messier and more painful.
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As a common, not a reserved gift, he will argue, the sense of
justice is concomitant with humanity itself, such that our history
is its history . It may rely on knowledge and make use of
techniques, but finally it is neither of these. It takes root in social
urgencies, in the need to act when the facts are muddled or their
meaning unclear, and the form it acquires, when finally it does,
is given it in the songs of bards, the words of poets, the eloquence
of jurists . Over time it is built up and collected, some of it written,
some of it not, and in that form takes on authority and a noble
name. That name is jurisprudence.
III

Such, then, are the contrasting sensitivities of the Western
spirit. On the Greek view, the apogee of human culture is science
and abstract thought; on the Roman, it is eloquence and the prudence of law. As disjunctive as these views seem, rarely does
either assert itself with absolute validity or give no credibility to the
other, and there are instances to be found-the work of Aristotle
being one-in which a plain effort is made to combine the two
emphases. In the main, however, specific individuals, eras, indeed
whole cultures in the West are marked by one of these two modes
of sensing and thinking, and thus of ordering their actions. This
is, I realize, a grand historical claim, one that I can do no more
than propose here, for my concern at the moment is to lay out
the case for the primacy of eloquence and jurisprudence, the
characteristic bias of what I am calling the "Roman" tradition. To
do this, however, I must first give some thought to the human
experience of space and time, for it is in it that the Romans have
the basis for their claim.
I am not interested here in the metaphysics of time and space,
whether they form a continuum or an empty void, or whether
they have an absolute or relational reality, or whether they are
separate or correlative entities; I wish only to remark on how we
are conscious of them and how we act as a consequence of that
experience. For whatever the ontological status of space and time
may be, our experience of them is neither simple nor univocal,
but embraces at least two recognizable forms.
Routinely in our everyday life, and always in a scientific life,
we experience and act upon time and space as measured or
measurable quantities, as settled or fixed points within a structured universe. No sooner did Rhea produce a child, the myth
tells us, than Chronos her husband would devour it. So it is that
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we speak of chronology, time that merely passes, one moment
like the next, each arising only to be swallowed whole. This is
the time of a ticking watch, a succession of homogeneous units,
the kind of time that seems "physical" or external, the kind we
need not internalize or be aware of, much less understand, but
merely take account of in our plans and expectations. So also
space on this account, which we do not experience as a place or
even a cluster of places, but merely as size or dimension. This is
the experience of space as expanse, as a definable stretch of territory or distance-acreage,
furlongs, light years. As with time that
is quantified, space that is measured is public and reliable, as
familiar to us as the furniture in our home, requiring of us only
that we not ignore it when reckoning or moving about.
This first experience of time and space is of capital importance
in our lives, for without it we could not schedule our trains,
rendezvous with a friend, measure the pressure of our blood,
predict our weather, or put a man on the moon. Our dependence
on it is continuous if largely unconscious, and to the extent it fails
us or we become incapable of it we are literally "disoriented," the
proper subject of human pity if not psychiatric attention. "Snap
out of it," we advise a daydreamer, while the schizophrenic who
is inhabiting two "worlds" we must occasionally hospitalize as a
danger to himself and society. The essence of measured time and
space is uniformity or continuity, which makes of them "domestic"
realities, completely reliable and predictable. Time that is measured has no surprises and in this sense is "timeless" or eternal,
even as measured space is "placeless" or utopian, one spot like
the next. They are as such the contours of cosmos, our universe
as structured whole, and the necessary conditions for manipulating our environment in a regular and confident way. Because of
them we can even seek to know our world through its principles
or archai, to discover the process beneath all appearance and
change, indeed the reasons for change itself. We call such knowledge theoria, science.
As necessary as this first experience of time and space is,
there is every indication that we find it, in the end, intolerable,
or at least insufficient; for however regular our lives or disciplined
our minds, not every moment is the same to us, nor are any two
spots alike. "That was a long lecture," a student will quip; "Too
long," his friend will reply, and in that simple phrase tell us that
time has quality as well as quantity. Time always passes, to be
sure, but it also flies or drags, is full or is empty, and bears
numerous other relationships to the lives it defines. Depression
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can flatten this experience of time, turning each moment into a
replica of the other, but to a spirit that is truly alive a moment of
crisis can never be mistaken for daily routine, nor will an hour
spent in the arms of someone he loves be like that of any other.
For time in our experience is not mere chronology; it is also occurrence or event, having consequence and particularity. It can even
be unique. Space too, when experienced this way, loses the safe
homogeneity it has as dimension and becomes a texture of relationships, a place. Set a vase of flowers on an empty table and you
bring the entire room to life, giving it focus and coherence, every
angle and line changed: the space that before was too readily an
expanse is now defiantly a place, something to see and to come
to terms with. A cathedral, a prison cell, a village square, a hospital
room, any space that comforts or challenges or moves us deeply
is so resolutely a place that it requires of us an effort of mind to
think of it, like every space, as a bounded expanse, even as a
child of five is not easily convinced that its mother is also simply
a woman.
Experienced qualitatively, space and time become for us the
places and events by which we mark our lives and know ourselves,
and thus judge and are judged. Some places and events are so
wholly private in their significance that they are idiosyncratic,
known only by ourselves for what they are and for what we are
as a consequence of them. We choose not to share them, or we
have abandoned all hope of ever having them shared, and thus
we enjoy or endure them in silence. Most places and events,
however, are in some way shared realities, defining more lives
than our own and taking on in this way a public or quasi-public
character. Even one's birthday, which could never be to another
the event it is to one's self, is the possession of those who remember and help celebrate it. One's death, on the other hand, is
an event at all only to the extent that it creates loss and causes
one's memory or accomplishments to be kept alive. Few places
and events, of course, are regularly acknowledged or celebrated,
but those that are give point to our public and social lives. We
christen ships, throw housewarming parties, and surround a new
government with pomp, circumstance, and the striking of medals.
We set aside spaces as sacred or special and respect those that
history has consecrated; we pilgrimage to spots of religious power,
reenact battles in situ, and protect the ruins which contain the
great moments of our past. Nature herself seems a part of the
effort, her wonders and marvels-deserts
and falls, canyons and
mountain peaks-being "natural" places of legend and lore, fervor
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and refreshment, while the seasons of her life, reflected in those
of our own, prompt us to establish, as if by instinct, elaborate
cycles of secular and religious feasts.
Individually and culturally, our lives are "fixed" by places
and events. We are caught up in them as if in a web, having in
them our bearing and orientation . To be "in place" and a part of
events, however, means also to be in flux, and thus in a kind of
permanent jeopardy. Not only is the web of our own life's meanings essentially tenuous, as often vague and uncertain as it is clear
and pronounced, but it is also a web that rarely if ever completely
overlaps with that of anyone else, much less with the elaborate and
complex set of rites and customs, verities and habits which form
our society or stamp the culture we know as our own . Thus life
in society is essentially tense, endlessly exposed-more
sharply
at times than at others-to the rise and fall of meaning. The hopes
of one class or region are folly to another; the places and events
that sustain one generation seem plain or trivial to the next. Even
when stabilized within a society, meaning can be eroded from
without, as when one people's values clash with another's, or
when the conditions of life itself are altered .
Doubtless there are patterns in social change, as there are in
history itself, and to come to know the principles of psyche, economy, and society is to achieve some purchase on our lives. In
and beyond any success of this kind, however, we sense fundamentally the need to come to wonder about ourselves, to discover
less the archaiof our lives than their topoi, their significant "places"
or moments, and to bring these findings to expression. Our habits
and gestures are the silent beginning of this process, while diaries,
letters, and autobiographies are its highest and most articulate
form. Society at large has much the same need, and to similar
result. Artists and songsters have social as well as personal visions,
which they state in anger or in praise or with mere indifference.
Pundits, commentators, and holders of public office are obliged or
driven to speak freely about society, debating how its goals are
adequate or lacking, and how its institutions serve or fail the
public weal. Claimants, lawyers, and justices, if they are to have
any success at all, must catch up the drama of an individual's life
within a relevant context of society's resolve and experience; at
their best they will reveal the demands of stated ideals or open
new vistas on a culture's past and future-the
accomplishment
of the best biographers and historians. Most fundamental of all,
citizens themselves give voice to their experience simply by the
·way they arrange their lives, acquiring new tastes and abandoning
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others, continuing or refining the mores of their parents, choosing
to maintain or to reject the civic heroes and celebrations to which
they were introduced as growing children. To come to word in
this way means above all else to consider and judge the topoior
"places" of one's life, to seek out its strongest or most significant
moments and bring them into some coherence. The knowledge
achieved in this way is true and reliable knowledge, though it
bears little resemblance to the knowledge of science. It is not uninterested in pattern, repetition, and formula, but it takes its focus
in singular, concrete places and events. It is not the knowledge
that conquers change or renders it harmless; it is the conscious
innerside of change itself. Called by its most general name, this
knowledge is poiesis,knowing by making, poetry.
IV

It is in the full, poignant sense of time and space that oratory
has its origin, and with it the philosophical tradition I am calling
the "Roman." "The ambition to speak well," writes Cicero, following an opinion of Aristotle, "does not arise when men are engaged
in establishing government, nor occupied with the conduct of
war, nor shackled and chained by the authority of kings. Upon
peace and tranquility eloquence attends as their ally; it is, one
may say, the offspring of well-established civic order." The "order"
claimed here as the basis for oratory is anything but patient, dull,
or complacent. It is an entirely active order of things, one in which
men are thrown back on their own resources and made to feel
responsible for the shape of their lives. "Order" and "crisis" are
here coexistent, though the crisis is one of liberty, not of repression
or of the very struggle for existence. Cicero makes this clear in
the example he gives. After living for years under tyranny, the
inhabitants of Sicily cast out the invaders and set about restoring
their former way of life. Being acute and disputatious by nature,
they sought the restitution of private property through legal argumentation, but the process they followed was careless and unmethodical. Thus two of their own, Corax and Tisias, drew up
precepts and rules for making an argument, and so invented the
art of rhetoric.
Even if apocryphal, the story serves well to show that rhetoric,
as the logic of public discourse, is rooted in social urgency. We
notice, first of all, how issues of time and space press upon the
Sicilians, for in their initial liberation they are temporally and
spatially disoriented. So long as the tyrants were in control, time
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as a social entity was suspended and the places that once gave
texture and specificity to the Sicilians' lives were merged as if into
a single, alien domain. Their lands, to be sure, remained familiar
in their simple dimensionality, and chronological time continued
its relentless course, taking its toll on all things natural, including
themselves. But the places and events which before gave structure
to their lives fell victim, with liberty itself, to the ways of the
tyrants. With tyranny's end, all this has changed: places and
events are again in their control and suddenly there is need to
make connections with the way things were.
Every rhetorical act takes its start in an urgency of this kind.
Always it is impelled by the single, insistent question, quid sit
agendum, what is to be done? In an extreme sense, well exploited
by the critics of our day, every moment of civil life is intrinsically
rhetorical. But to the ancients who formulated rhetorical theory,
three situations were paradigmatic: the court of law, in which two
barristers (or a barrister and a judge) wrestle over the fate of an
accused-and this they called forensic or judicialoratory; the political assembly, in which courses of state action are debated---deliberative oratory; and the public address, in which praise or blame is
distributed or a view set forth on an issue of interest or controversy-demonstrative
or epideicticoratory . In the case of our
legendary Sicilians, the rhetorical situation is framed by the need
they have to set the boundaries of one another's property. A
simple resumption of the past is not possible, for the whim of the
tyrants and the mere passage of time have altered the past beyond
recognition. Fences have been removed and fields redivided; flocks
have been combined or thinned; buildings have been destroyed
or added to; implements have been lost or stolen; families have
been changed through marriage and death; loyalties have shifted
and memories faded; and in many other ways the past has been
put beyond ready reach. Yet, for all its fragmented, almost mocking presence in the chiaroscuro image of it in current arrangements,
it is the past that must be bridged if the new order of things is to
be a just one. How is this to be done?
The Sicilians have that "sense of justice" that Zeus sent
through Hermes to supplement our technical skills; indeed we ·
may assume that it is available in equal measure to each of them,
such that no one, by virtue of birth or status, has a superior moral
imagination. As with every virtue, however, justice speaks louder
in abstraction than in context. The voice it lacks in context must
be furnished it by passsionate but fair-minded men, each advocating a vision of what is, under the circumstances, rational, good,
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and proper. What one man asserts, another will deny; what one
urges as appropriate another rejects as foolish or inequitable. In
classical rhetoric, a situation of this kind is called a causa-a "case"
from the standpoint of the adjudicators, a "cause" from that of
the contenders. Like boxers squaring off, the contenders take their
"stands" in the matter; thus rhetoric speaks also of the status of
the case, the issue or issues that emerge from it and need to be
decided. If the case is not plain, if the course of action to be taken
is not immediately obvious to all who look at the matter openly,
then it must be argued, each contender setting forth that idea of
equitable action that seems to him most compelling.
What is at stake in the case is not merely the claims of the
contenders, but also the shape of the community, its sense of
things past, present, and above all future. Unlike a philosophical
debate, in which differing opinions are tested for their logic, coherence, and supporting evidence, a rhetorical argument puts society
itself to the test. The argument must of course be clear, consistent,
and founded on valid testimony, but its final appeal is to a vision
of social resolve and behavior, one that is forceful enough to
persuade. In the case at hand, our Sicilians are concerned for their
lands, but in the social rather than the physical sense. The properties they are contending for have a natural existence which is
largely untouched by the words spoken over them and about them;
what they lack is social reality, a clear, unequivocal relationship
to the people who inhabit and cultivate them. That is a reality
that can be brought into being through argument alone. The decisions the Sicilians reach may have a marginal, accidental effect
on crop yield, productivity, and similar natural and economic
realities; but their choices will effect themselves as a people in a
fundamental way, both in the literal sense of giving legal reality
to what is contended for, and in the higher, moral sense of defining
their grasp of justice.
V

The rhetorical act, then, is the formal act of society in crisis, the
process through which it judges itself and determines its future.
Structurally seen, the act is a contest of "things and words" -res
et verba, in the classical phrase-of arguments drawn from the
traditions of the people and the facts at hand and expressed in language that is forceful and effective. To have its effect, an argument
must not only state a vision; it must also make it plausible, more
consistent with society's sense of itself than that of any rival vision.
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A society in crisis is not one in chaos. Chaos implies the
absence of order and the consequent inability to conduct civil life.
It can descend on a society through an invasion from without,
either military or cultural, or it can be the result of an internal
development, the gradual weakening of communication leading
to a state in which, as the ancient saying had it, "there are as
many opinions as heads." A crisis, on the other hand, is a challenge to consensus, the natural tugging at social bonds, at times
quite severe, that is endemic to a vibrant culture. A healthy society
is not one that avoids conflict but one that can channel it into
established forms of argumentation and learn to abide by its outcomes. Such was the triumph of our ancient Sicilians, and because
of it they were praised by Aristotle and Cicero as the model of a
civil society.
The invention of the Sicilians was rhetoric, understood as the
logic of argumentation, indeed of all civil discourse. Discourse of
this kind is expressly nontechnical, a dialogue among citizens,
not experts. What does it mean to reason with the people, arguing
among the simple who cannot take in a complicated argument?
It means first to canvass a situation to its full extent, trying to see
it in all its many aspects and selecting from among them those
which are most trenchant and persuasive. It means also to enlarge
on particulars, to state as general maxims the opinions one's listeners hold about their own situations. And it means finally to
catch up one's argument in stirring images, in language that can
so much embrace one's self, one's listeners, and the shared situation that all are impelled to act effectively and as one. Discourse
of this kind is indeed a showing of reasons (logoi), reasons that
reveal the particulars of the case and appeal to the common sense
of things. But it is more: it is an affective bonding between speaker
and listeners. Through the demeanor of the orator (ethos)and the
emotions he evokes (pathos),justice is seen and felt, and only thus
truly known.
The res or "things" of an argument are the facts of a case
illuminated by relevant "places" (topoi) in a society's life. In a
genuine controversy, both the facts to be emphasized and the
"places" to be invoked are matters of choice, requiring the keenest
judgment of the orator; if the facts are obvious and the sense of
society is clear, the case is plain and need not be argued. The
precedents for a case-the customs, laws, habits and decisions
that precede it-are, by definition, "authoritative," being the
marks of society's prior achievements, its "just prejudices," as
Edmund Burke put it so well. They are innately powerful, bearing
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the weight of past triumphs, and must be reckoned with as the
simple facts of society. Equally powerful, though differently so,
are the facts of the case, the unique set of circumstances that
somehow confront a society and its accustomed ways, demanding
attention and adjudication. An alleged crime, a civil conflict, a
social crisis, a political debate-whatever
describes the challenge
at hand-it must be dealt with through argument and action.
Argumentation reveals itself as a process of construction, the
artful adaptation of facts to precedents and of precedents to facts.
This process, moreover, is not merely mental; it is social, and thus
it is bound to language (verba)-to images, gestures, and words.
Language is the necessary bridge between precedents and facts. To
be sure, a precedent-a maxim, an aphorism, a sentence, a law-is
itself language, but it is frozen language; its words confront us as
authority. A fact is equally stubborn, claiming a peculiarity that
resists all classification. Both the precedent and the fact stand
within the flow of living speech, which in turn reflects a society's
sensus communis. It is thus to language, more precisely to
metaphor, that the orator turns, to language that is at once familiar
and fresh, seeking that linguistic bridge between present and past
that will be recognized as most "apt." In this process of selection
and construction, victory goes to the ingenious, the contender
who can so marshal "things" and "words," ideas and language,
as to say what is-at the moment-"called
for," suited to the
occasion, fitting and proper, appropriate and decorous, and so
advance the cause of public life. His victory consists in having
shown that his own sense (sensus proprius) of the relation of the
facts and the precedents better conforms with the sense of society
(sensus communis) than that of any opponent.
The outcome of the process of argument is the sententia, the
judgment reached or the opinion advanced. Though pronounced
in the context of an individual case, such as all instances of oratory
are, the sententia has a universal character, an authority reflected
stylistically in its brevity. Usually one sentence in length, a sententia
literally punctuates a discourse, bringing it to a point and a close.
Here thought and language interpenetrate,
reinforcing one
another: the last expression is the most thoughtful, and the last
thought is the most expressive. In the context of law, the sententia
is particularly poignant. A "sentence" in court is both language
and idea, both verbaand res, each commanding authority. To "pass
sentence" means both to "render judgment," thus bringing a process of reasoning to a close, and to "make a statement," thus
adding a text to the stock of public language in which culture has
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its identity. As a spoken judgment (judicatum), a sentence holds
authority (auctoritas)and so orders the life of a people; as a norm
of social existence, it becomes precedent (praeiudicium)for further
cases of its kind, such that future plaintiffs must build their claims
with reference to it.
Like hermeneutics, then, rhetoric too has its circle. It deals
in matters of deliberate human action, the truth of which must
be established through language. In cases of law, the reality of a
deed is only then constituted when set within the context of justice
and social values. In political debate, a proposed action becomes
real only when fitted by its supporters within a polity's sense of
its heritage and its dreams. In these instances, moreover, language-particular,
chosen words and images-participates
in the
making of truth. The legal status of the accused is established
through argument, and one case becomes precedent for the next.
Political action is shaped through debate, the outcome of which
is the basis for future deliberations. In such a wise, as the ancients
liked to say, "reason itself is written down," giving standing and
identity to the culture whose voice it is.

